We present an algorithm for solving S-Games. Our algorithm can be used to compute approximately the value of the game as well as €-optimal strategies of the two players. For games with similar structure to S-games which do not necessarily possess a value, the algorithm can sometimes be used as a heuristic procedure for determining the existence of a minimax solution. Further, it is shown that a certain simple class of differential games (we call them "differential S-games") can be viewed as static games and solved by the above procedure.
Introduction
We shall consider a two-person, zero-sum game played as follows: Player P2 chooses a point s in a compact set S in Rn while player P chooses a coordinate i of Rn. The payoff to P1 is the ith coordinate s of s.
Such games were first studied by Blackwell and Girshick [2] , pp. 4 7 -5 1 and are often referred to as S-games.
i In this note we present an algorithm (Section 2) for approximately computing the value and E-optimal strategies, for both players in an S-game. Our algorithm reduces the problem to a sequence of minimization problems. Thus the computational strength of the procedure is determined by the strength of the existing techniques for solving the associated minimum problems. If the set S is not known to be compact our algorithm can lead to a heuristic procedure for testing the existence of the value.
We expect that one fruitful area of application for our algorithm will be that of finding solutions for what we call "Differential S-Games." These are differential games in which only one player (the minimizer) controls the law of motion, while the other player can decide only which out of a fixed number of functionals will be used to compute the payoff. Thus a differential S-game is an essentially control theoretic problem3 complicated by the uncertainity as to which performance index is being used during the process. In Section 3 we show that under suitable assumptions these games can be analyzed as S-games, and consequently that our algorithm can be applied. Of course, the effectiveness of the algorithm will now depend on our ability to solve the associated sequence of optimal control problems. A simple example is given in Section 4 .
An Algorithm for S-Games
Let ? be an S-game as described in the introduction. For such a game Blackwell and Girshick [2] estab3For an introduction to the theories of differential games and optimal control we refer the reader to Isaacs, 151 and Berkowitz 111, respectively. Department of Mathematics, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago, IL.
60680'
lished the following result.
Theorem 2.1. The game has a value, v(r).
Both players have optimal randomized strategies and further, player P possesses an optimal strategy which randomizes on at most n points of S.
2
We shall now outline a procedure which shows that within some EX), an approximation to the value and to E-optimal strategies for both players can be obtained by solving a sequence of appropriate matrix games, and a corresponding sequence of minimization problems. Our algorithm is a generalization of Troutt's ( s e e 181, pp.
343-345) algorithm for non-convex s -games.
Let X = (X, ... X ) be an arbitrary probability vector, and define for each s E S n i=l H(X,s) = 1 xisi.
(1)
Here si = ith coordinate of s . Our algorithm will be as powerful as our ability to solve the following minimization problem: minimize H (X, s ) .
(2)

S E S
In the next two sections it will be seen that thi algorithm is potentially at least, applicable to a large class of problems. . . . , s ) be an nxk matrix whose jth column is the point k s j E S. Also, let v (A) stand for the value of a matrix game A.
The Algorithm
Step 1. [Initialization] . For each coordinate i = lr2, ..., n solve the minimization problem (2) with X = e the ith vector of the standard basis of Rn.
This yields a set of n points in S, say, 5 , E ,...,En.
Now construct the matrix A1
= A(C1,C2,. . . ,<"), and compute its value, v(A ) and a pair of optimal strategy if 1 2 1 v e c t o r s A1 and q1 f o r p l a y e r s P1 and P2 i n t h e m a t r i x game A . ( i ) I f t h e a l g o r i t h m t e r m i n a t e s i n k i t e r a t i o n s , 
( i i i ) G i v e r . E > 0 , t h e r e e x i s t s a p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r k
M s u c h t h a t >?,Urn are E-optimal f o r p l a y e r s P1 and P2 f o r a l l m _> X.
Proof. 
F o r p l a y e r P1, assume t h a t t h e r e d o e s n o t e x i s t a p o s i t i v e i n t e q e r M s u c h t h a t (iii) i s s a t i s f i e d f o r a l l
m 2 M. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a subsequence {mrjFl o f p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r s s u c h t h a t f o r e v e r y r ,
NOW i t i s p o s s i b l e t o t o f i n d r and L s u c h t h a t m < m and r k Now u s i n g t h e f a c t t h a t we o b t a i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o ( 6 ) , namely
L! we s h a l l now b r i e f l y d i s c u s s t h e s i t u a t i o n where
t h e s e t S i s n o t known to be compact. 
I t could happep t h a t t h e game s t i l l possesses a minimax s o l u t i o n , and our algorithm could sometimes s t i l l b e u s e f u l a s a h e u r i s t i c p r o c e d u r e f o r " g u e s s i n g " t h e s o l u t i o n . T h i
t o a comron limit 3 , t h e n t h e v a l u e e x i s t s and e q u a l s 9. Thus t h e a l g o r i t n m Of
Theorem 2 . 2 s t i l l y i e l d s a n a p p r o x i m a t e SClUtiOn.
Remark 2.4. Note t n a t as soon as our algorithm prod u c e s a n i n t e r v a l Gk,$] which i s small and ' which i s near e,, we a r e i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a p a i r (A , q ) of reasonably good s t r a t e g i e s f o r P1 and F2 i n t h e following sense:
The expected gain of P1 w i l l be a t l e a s t Skel when he uses ;%k+l w h i l e t h e e x p e c t e d loss of F will be no more than ck when he u s e s . With such a F a i r o f s t r a t e g i e s a t hand, the question of whether t h e v a l u e a c t u a l l y e x i s t s may be of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t .
3. A C l a s s o f D i f f e r e n t i a l S-Games I n t h i s s e c t i o n we i n t r o d u c e a s p e c i a l c l a s s o f d i f f e r e n t i a l games which can b e a n a l y z e d a s s t a t i c S-games and hence we s h a l l c a l l them D i f f e r e n t i a l S-Games.
Such a game c a n a l s o b e viewed a s a g m e between a c o n t r o l l e r i n t h e u s u a l c o n t r o l t h e o r e t i c sense and an antagonistic oFponent who can decide which o f t h e f i n i t e l y many p o s s i b l e p a y o f f f u n c t i o n a l s w i l l b e u s e d t o compute t h e c o n t r o l l e r ' s l o s s . That choice of t t e payoff functional remains unknown u n t i l t h e end o f t h e game. More p r e c i s e l y , we c o n s i d e r a d i f f e r e n t i a l Game 7 with R" a s s t a t e space played by two p l a y e r s P F o v e r t h e f i x e d t i m e i n t e r v a l I = [3,11. A t each time t E I , F p i c k s a n e l e n e n t v ( t ) from a Compact s u b s e t v of RL i n s u c h a way t h a t v ( t ) i s measurable.
Player pl, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , p i c k s o u t a number i from t h e s e t N = { l ,~, .
. . ,n3 a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e 1' 2 2 game.
The "law of motion" of the game is specified by the differential equation
Here x E Rm and f: I x R x V + Rm is a continous m function satisfying a Lipschitz condition
The law of motion is given by whenever x1,x2 E Rm, t E I, v E V; K is some fixed positive number.
The equation (9) now has a unique solution x (t) corresponding to any given initial condition x(0) = x the resulting solution shall be called the trajectory corresponding to v(*). We may now compute the payoff H(i,v) which P will pay to P1 at the end of the game, by
Here h: I x Rm x N x V + R is a continuous uniformly bounded function.
(11)
We shall associate with every pure control the ncomponent vector
It is shown in 141 that the set v of pure controls can be chosen so that the set
It is now clear that our game is equivalent to an S-game as formulated in Section 1. Namely, player P2 chooses a point s of a compact set S in Rn while player P chooses a coordinate i of Rn. The payoff to P1 is the ith coordinate si of s , that is, H(i,v) . 
E v
The algorithm of Section 2 is now applicable to the differentials-game and will be as powerful as our ability to solve the following optimal control problem in pure controls:
A Simple Example
We shall now illustrate the working of our algorithm. The example solved below shows that this algorithm can sometimes yield approximate optimal solutions even in games which do not precisely fit the theory of Sections 2 and 3, provided that the conceptual ingredients of an S-game are present.
Player P1 has only two choices, 1 or 2 and
The expression (12) of Section 3 now becomes H(X,v) = I,, 1 [XllOv 2 (t)+X2(X 2 (t)+v 2 (t))ldt. (15) Since in this example H(X,v) is convex in v and linear in A it follows from Sion's Theorem [7] that we can take v tu be the whole of L2 [O,l] and be assured that the value exists. In order to apply our algorithm the optimal control problem (13) has to be solvable. If the minimization in (13) The vector r-may be regarded as the "nearly" optimal set of weights which player I1 can assign to the six 5 pure controls correspondmg to the columns of A'. The exact expression for the fifth and the sixth of these is obtained by substituting the appropriate values of y, A1 and A in (17) . 
